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The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were an 
enormous setback for the cause of nonviolence. They 
provided a stimulus and ostensible justification for a 
spiral of violence in which nonviolent alternatives are 
marginalised. Nonviolence offers numerous ways to 
oppose and prevent terrorism, but such responses are 
totally at odds with the way government leaders 
conceive the world. 
At first glance, there is no reason why the attacks 
should undermine nonviolent approaches in the 
slightest. After all, proponents of nonviolence 
unanimously condemned the attacks, just as they have 
consistently promoted nonviolent methods of struggle 
as an alternative to violence. The problem is that 
nonviolent methods of challenging violence and 
oppression have little visibility or credibility within 
governments or mainstream media, where the only 
credible response to terrorism is seen as military 
attack, surveillance and repression. 
At the core of nonviolent action is political jiu-jitsu 
(Sharp, 1973). If nonviolent activists circulate a 
petition, join a rally, go on strike or hold a vigil and are 
countered by violence, such as beatings or killings, 
Page 1 of 10Nonviolence versus terrorism, by Brian Martin
5/16/2006http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/02sa.html
observers are likely to give increased support for the 
activists. Violence used against nonviolent protesters is 
widely seen as unjust and rebounds against those who 
use violence. Through political jiu-jitsu, activists can 
use the violence of their opponents to build support 
and undermine their opponents' power. 
Even a little violence on the side of the activists greatly 
weakens political jiu-jitsu. This is why police often use 
infiltrators to provoke violence by protesters, thereby 
legitimising police violence, even when there is a great 
inequality in the two sides' capacity for and use of 
violence. During the intifada of 1987-1993, 
Palestinians who threw stones against Israeli guns and 
tanks reduced the perception of a qualitative difference 
between the two sides. 
So what happens is that violence legitimates 
counterviolence. The 11 September attacks have 
legitimated massive counterviolence, most obviously in 
Afghanistan but also in the form of surveillance and 
repression of social activists everywhere. US 
government leaders have rhetorically linked terrorism 
and dissent, helping to legitimate attacks on civil 
liberties, including ways of undermining and 
countering nonviolent protest. 
The 11 September attacks reveal in stark form how 
counterproductive violence is for promoting justice 
and equality. They have provided the ideal pretext for 
massive expansion in apparatuses for 'state security,' 
including spying, detention, disruption and torture. By 
the same token, the US government's military actions 
will provoke greater support for terrorist approaches. 
What results is a type of 'violence race,' analogous to 
military races. 
  
Nonviolence against Terrorism 
One way that nonviolent approaches can be mobilised 
against terrorism is by reducing the vulnerability of 
high-technology societies to sabotage and terrorism. 
Today, it requires only a small amount of equipment 
and a few knowledgeable people to bring down a large 
dam, a power plant or an oil refinery. A few computer 
programmers can create chaos by disrupting 
telecommunications or even just traffic lights in a large 
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city. Large industrial plants can be brought to a halt by 
damage in key places. 
Industrial society's vulnerability to sabotage provides a 
justification for military defence, since enemy troops 
cannot be allowed access to key installations. 
Imagine, on the other hand, a society relying on 
nonviolent methods for defence. It would be unwise to 
rely on large power plants, fertiliser plants or indeed 
any other facility that could be easily destroyed or 
occupied to hold a community to ransom. Instead, 
technologies would need to be designed or chosen to 
be robust against attack. Instead of large power plants, 
energy efficiency and small-scale renewable energy 
sources could be used. Microhydro would reduce 
vulnerability compared to large dams. Organic farming 
would be far less vulnerable than monocultures. This 
sort of analysis can be applied to a range of 
technologies (Martin, 2001). 
In the light of the 11 September attacks, it seems that it 
would be better to promote small-scale buildings 
rather than giant office blocks and to carefully consider 
the use of air transport. But beyond reducing physical 
vulnerability, technologies should be chosen and 
designed to foster a greater sense of community 
solidarity which will in turn increase the capacity for 
nonviolent struggle. For example, office buildings that 
encourage workers to get to know each other and work 
together are better for a nonviolent defence than ones 
that foster isolation and alienation. 
A second nonviolent option against terrorism is timely 
awareness of the possibility of attacks so that steps can 
be taken to prevent them. Conventionally this is called 
'intelligence,' which involves collecting information 
and drawing conclusions from it. The 11 September 
attacks revealed a massive failure of conventional 
intelligence despite annual expenditures of tens of 
billions of dollars. 
A forthcoming study by Dutch researcher Giliam de 
Valk suggests a nonviolent 'intelligence system' would 
do better. He compares the performance of Dutch 
government intelligence services with the performance 
of the Shipping Research Bureau (1995), a non-
government operation that studied violations of UN 
resolutions against South Africa's apartheid regime in 
the 1980s. The Shipping Research Bureau did far 
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better according to a whole range of criteria. 
One of the big problems with spy operations is that 
they operate in secrecy. This reduces communication 
within agencies as well as with outsiders, and enables 
inadequate thinking or incompetence to persist. The 
Shipping Research Bureau, because it was open, could 
better verify information by seeking reactions from 
opponents such as shipping companies. It published 
its reports and used subsequent criticism to learn from 
its mistakes rather than covering them up. The 
Bureau's public credibility also enhanced its 
information gathering capacity: in its final years of 
operation, it was able to obtain information from 
within apartheid South Africa itself. 
An open nonviolent intelligence system would do 
better than the US National Security Agency, CIA and 
FBI. It could hardly do worse than the failures of 
conventional intelligence - or political controls over 
intelligence - prior to 11 September. An open operation 
would be far more accountable to the public and could 
not so easily become a tool of state elites. Giliam de 
Valk thinks that there should be several open 
intelligence agencies, with competition between them 
to guard against politically biased or self-serving 
reports. 
A third crucial dimension to a nonviolence strategy 
against terrorism is to challenge the conditions that 
foster terrorism, including repressive regimes, poverty, 
injustice, inequality, exploitation, neocolonialism and 
torture. This is familiar territory to nonviolent activists 
who have played key roles in opposing apartheid in 
South Africa, communist repression in Eastern Europe 
and military dictatorships in several continents 
(Ackerman and DuVall, 2000). Not all struggles are 
successful but many are. 
It is remarkable that nonviolent action is ever 
successful considering what it is up against. Hundreds 
of billions of dollars are spent on militaries every year, 
with millions of soldiers in uniform and the most 
sophisticated technologies available developed by a 
significant proportion of the world's scientists and 
engineers. Added to this is production of what can be 
called the 'technology of repression,' including 
equipment and training for surveillance, crowd control 
and torture. Set against this enormous and powerful 
system for institutionalised violence and social control 
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are networks of action groups with relatively little 
money, training or productive capacity. 
A fourth component of a nonviolence strategy against 
terrorism works by showing results, namely that 
nonviolent approaches are more effective than 
terrorism in overcoming oppression and repression. 
Violence doesn't seem all that effective as a strategy for 
challengers: there is not a single case where popular 
armed struggle has toppled the government of an 
industrialised country. Perhaps the attraction of 
violence has less to do with proven or likely 
effectiveness and more to do with symbolic expression 
of masculine virility or attachment to secrecy, 
hierarchy and exclusionary politics. How to challenge 
the counterproductive allure of revolutionary violence 
is one of the great challenges for nonviolent 
communication. For example, in the Middle East there 
are excellent nonviolent actions and strategies (Crow 
et al., 1990; Dajani, 1994) but such efforts are 
overshadowed by violent approaches. 
  
Nonviolence against Hypocrisy 
Politicians and others define and think about terrorism 
in a way that excludes the role of 'respectable' states in 
terrorism. Terrorism is commonly defined as the use of 
violence by nonstate groups and so-called 'rogue states' 
against civilians for political purposes. This is a very 
selective, indeed incoherent, usage (Gearty, 1997). 
Dictionaries define terrorism more generically as, for 
example, 'an organised system of intimidation, 
especially for political ends' or 'the systematic use of 
terror especially as a means of coercion' or 'domination 
or coercion by intimidation.' 
By such definitions, governments can be involved in 
terrorism. The evidence is that state terrorism is far 
greater than non-state terrorism, but state terrorism, 
except in the case of US-government-defined 'rogue 
states,' receives little attention (Campbell and Brenner, 
2000; Herman, 1982; Stohl and Lopez, 1984). Many 
methods of warfare, such as bombing of civilians or 
use of anti-personnel weapons, are terroristic. Indeed, 
strategic bombing has similarities with genocide 
(Markusen and Kopf, 1995). It is well documented that 
the US and other western governments have 
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repeatedly used, sponsored, supported or tolerated 
terrorism and regimes that use it (Blum, 2000; 
Chomsky and Herman, 1979). For example, US 
bombing in the Southeast Asian war killed hundreds of 
thousands of civilians. The US and many other 
governments supported Saddam Hussein's regime in 
Iraq during the 1980s despite its use of torture and 
chemical warfare. Via Pakistan's intelligence service, 
the CIA supported the mujahideen in Afghanistan 
from the 1980s onwards. This included support for bin 
Laden's network (Johnson, 2000). In the US 
government's attack on Afghanistan after 11 
September, it has forged alliances with governments 
and forces known for serious human rights abuses, 
including Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan's 
Northern Alliance. 
One way for nonviolent activists to respond to the self-
interested mindsets of governments about terrorism is 
to refuse to accept their antiterrorist agendas and 
instead make independent assessments of terror and 
repression. Rather than (or as well as) using 
nonviolent action against the Gulf War, a more timely 
intervention would have been a programme of action 
against Saddam Hussein's regime in the 1980s, and 
against support for the regime by the US and many 
other governments. 
A more timely intervention against the 11 September 
attacks and the subsequent war in Afghanistan was 
possible. The antecedents grew out of the cold war 
confrontation between the US and Soviet 
governments, one facet of which was superpower 
rivalry in Afghanistan, including longstanding Soviet 
influence in the country, CIA support for opposition 
groups, the 1979 Soviet invasion and subsequent CIA 
support for mujahideen opponents, including al-
Qaeda. Thus there were many opportunities for 
nonviolent intervention against Soviet and US war-
making and support for terrorist groups. 
The most significant actual contribution in this context 
was the spontaneous and successful nonviolent 
resistance to the 1991 Soviet coup, a resistance that 
helped bring an end to the Soviet Union. What has 
been lacking is a powerful, systematic programme of 
nonviolent action against repression and terrorism in 
Afghanistan over the past several decades. This is not a 
criticism of the nonviolence movement but rather a 
comment on gross disparity between resources 
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available for military forces and repression compared 
to those available for nonviolent action. 
  
What to do? 
In the aftermath of 11 September, there were many 
eloquent commentaries criticising the US 
government's rush into a 'war on terrorism.' However, 
much of this writing seemed written for governments, 
as authors either said how counterproductive or 
unethical it would be to bomb civilians or encouraged 
the addressing of longstanding sources of grievance 
(such as the treatment of Palestinians). While I agree 
with the arguments, pleas to governments are unlikely 
to have much impact. After all, peace activists have 
been arguing for decades that war and violence are 
counterproductive, but seldom do government leaders 
take any notice. In commentaries about 11 September, 
little has been said about what individuals can do 
besides protest against government policy. 
So, what is a supporter of nonviolence to do in the 
aftermath of 11 September? Possibilities mentioned 
here include supporting technologies that are less 
vulnerable to attack, supporting nonviolent 
intelligence operations, documenting and promoting 
the advantages of nonviolent action compared to 
terrorism, and using nonviolent action against 
repression and oppression. 
Another option is to not be distracted by the rhetoric of 
the 'war on terrorism' but instead to carefully assess all 
situations involving violence, including state terrorism, 
and act where the most impact can be made. This 
might include exposing the hypocrisy of governments 
when they point the finger only at terrorism by others 
and never at their own roles in manufacturing and 
exporting weapons and torture equipment, in training 
soldiers and torturers, in propping up dictatorships 
and undermining democracies, and in fighting wars. 
It is wise for nonviolent activists to listen to diverse 
voices in the debates that followed 11 September. But 
should the nonviolence movement's agenda be 
determined by the attacks and the 'war on terrorism'? 
Or is it better for individuals and groups to keep doing 
the things that they think will be effective? 




I thank Giliam de Valk and Wendy Varney for valuable 
comments on drafts. 
  
Additional comments by 
Giliam de Valk 
I agree that it is vital to oppose the conditions that 
foster terrorism. Another possibility for achieving this 
is implementation of a so-called human rights 
paragraph. The idea is that if Western security gives 
support to a third party - to train them or supply them 
with weapons or intelligence - this third party has to 
sign a statement supporting human rights. Since 
Western security often operates in secrecy, this is far 
from a complete remedy. Its main function would 
follow the working of the Helsinki Agreements on 
human rights. Time after time, dissident and human 
rights groups in communist Eastern Europe referred to 
the Helsinki Agreements. Like those agreements, a 
human rights paragraph could promote a change in 
thinking among citizens, including some working 
within the security apparatus. 
The idea of 'asymmetric conflict' - a conflict between 
parties with vastly different resources - can provide 
insight into terrorism and responses to it. When the 
CIA helped and trained networks and groups in 
Afghanistan, these groups fought an asymmetric 
conflict with the Soviets: guerrilla warfare. When 
finally some of those groups turned against the US, 
this guerrilla approach was transformed into 
terrorism, which is even more asymmetric than 
guerrilla warfare. 
I see a tension. Nonviolence is asymmetric to violence. 
If you opt for nonviolence in relation to the 11 
September attacks, you opt for an answer that is of a 
different nature than the stimulus for the attacks 
(military support for guerrillas). While I agree that 
nonviolence has great potential for preventing 
terrorism, there is a tension in relation to the inner 
logic of cause and effect if you focus on the phases 
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afterward. 
I doubt that the attacks would have taken place if 
Western security had not dealt the way it did with the 
networks that finally turned against the US. If the CIA 
- created to support and defend democratic legal order 
- had operated with groups that shared these values, 
an intervention in Afghanistan would not have 
occurred as it did. 
Still, we need to develop the capacity for nonviolence. 
In general, I agree with the need to discuss terrorism 
in relation to nonviolence and think that the major 
advantages are related to prevention. 
Giliam de Valk (giliamdevalk@hotmail.com) is 
completing his dissertation at the universities of 
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